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COMES TO PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
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INTRODUCTION 
Over the past several years, accountants have managed to ride out 
the storm of massive corporate accounting scandals, the demise of one 
of the premier accounting firms in the country, a tarnished perception of 
the profession, and the resulting impact of the landmark passage of 
Sarbanes-Oxley (“SOX”).3  Even though the worst seems to be behind 
us, the question still remains – are there still more ticking financial time-
bombs sitting out there waiting to go off?  If so, are investors better 
protected from economic ruin by Sarbanes-Oxley and related regulation?  
Despite early hopes and predictions that this legislation would stop 
future scandals and restore investor confidence, the jury is still out on 
whether this landmark legislation truly affords investors the protections 
it was intended to provide. 
 1. Glen M. Vogel, Esq. is an Assistant Professor of Legal Studies in the Hofstra 
University Zarb School of Business.  He would like to acknowledge and thank the Zarb 
School of Business for its generous research grant that contributed to the genesis of this 
Article.  He also extends gratitude to Hofstra Law School student Chris Cella and Zarb 
School of Business student Yusef Khan for their tremendously valuable research 
contributions. 
 2. Nathan S. Slavin, Ph.D., CPA, is a Professor and Chairman of the Department 
of Accounting, Taxation and Legal Studies in the Frank G. Zarb School of Business at 
Hofstra University. 
 3. Bill Carlino, After Major Repairs, Profession Awaits Detail Work, 
ACCOUNTING TODAY, Sept. 20, 2004, at 42. 
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Just over seven years ago in December of 2001, Enron – the 
nation’s seventh largest company based on reported revenues – filed for 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy, touching off an eruption of accounting scandals 
that rocked the financial world.4  At the time, Enron’s collapse was the 
largest corporate bankruptcy in American history, bringing down a 
company with approximately $33 billion in assets.5  Over a four-year 
period, Enron’s executives engaged in a fraudulent accounting scheme 
that included overstating profits and understating debts to drive up the 
stock price.  As the scheme unraveled, investors lost tens of billions of 
dollars as the stock price plummeted from a high of near $90 a share to 
less than $1 a share.6  All of this occurred despite the auditing oversight 
by one of the largest and most reputable accounting firms at the time – 
Arthur Andersen. 
Both Congress and the public were outraged that a fraud of such 
magnitude could be committed. At the urging of the President, Congress 
initiated hearings to examine the Enron collapse and to develop a plan to 
prevent similar fraudulent financial schemes from occurring in the fu-
ture.  Nevertheless, over the next half-dozen years, several other major 
American corporations such as Worldcom (2002), Adelphia Communi-
cations (2002), HealthSouth (2002), Qwest (2002), NYSE (2003), 
Parmalat (2003), Marsh and McLennan (2004), AIG (2005), Krispy 
Kreme (2005), and Fannie Mae (2006) followed the way of Enron and 
suffered economic collapse as a result of colossal accounting irregulari-
ties, insider trading, or outright theft.7 
In the midst of these very visible corporate implosions, accountants, 
attorneys, and other professionals and organizations who advised public 
companies were concerned over their expanding exposure as securities 
fraud plaintiffs and their respective counsel continually crafted new 
ways to claim that the former acted as enablers, or worse yet, contribu-
tors to the frauds committed by the public companies.8  The theory prof-
 4. Jaclyn Taylor, Fluke or Failure? Assessing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act After 
United States v. Scrushy, 74 U.M.K.C. L. REV. 411, 415 (2005). 
 5. Id. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Looking Back and Looking Forward: 
Sarbanes-Oxley and the Future of Corporate Governance, 40 AKRON L. REV. 1, 8 
(2007); see also John Patrick Kelsh, Section 304 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002: 
The Case for a Personal Culpability Requirement, 59 BUS. LAW. 1005 (2004). 
 8. See Peter Geier, Creative Litigation Ensnares Outside Counsel in Shareholder 
Suits, NAT’L L. J., Jan. 24, 2006, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/ihc/PubArticle 
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fered is that the “fraud[s] could not have taken place without lawyers’ 
and accountants’ advice to their clients . . . .”9  As a result, Wall Street, 
accounting firms, and outside counsel have not escaped unscathed.  
Arthur Andersen collapsed as a result of its role in auditing Enron and 
subsequently shredding Enron’s documents while it was the subject of a 
federal investigation.10 Similarly, Merrill Lynch, J.P. Morgan, Citigroup, 
and many other brokerage firms have been investigated for a myriad of 
alleged unethical activities.  Finally, law firms, including Enron’s legal 
counsel, Vinson & Elkins, which found itself as a defendant in the Enron 
multidistrict litigation,11 and Buchanan Ingersoll and Mayer Brown, 
have been named as defendants in investor suits.12 
While Enron crumbled and investigators uncovered Arthur 
Andersen’s role, the American public screamed for the government to 
intervene and prevent such economic disasters from happening again.  
On July 30, 2002, President Bush signed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act.13  One 
of the major goals of SOX was to create an environment of greater cor-
porate integrity and investor confidence by holding company officers 
personally accountable for financial misdeeds.  For example, Sections 
302 and 906 of SOX, the so-called “certification provisions” wherein 
high-level executives certify to the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (“SEC”) that the company’s regulatory filings are accurate, 
were drafted with the idea of “creat[ing] a link between the person and 
the document.”14  In fact, the impetus behind the inclusion of provisions 
that require CFOs and CEOs to certify financial statements to be filed 
with the SEC was that Congress intended these to be critical pieces of 
the statutory puzzle to preventing corporate corruption and fraud.15  
These provisions subjected corporate officers to personal civil and crim-
inal liability unlike ever before.  In fact, early predictions were that these 
IHC.jsp?id=1138023312254 (discussing the rise in litigation against law firms and 
attorneys in their roles as advisors to companies being sued for securities violations). 
 9. See id. 
 10. Timeline of Enron’s Collapse, WASH. POST, Sept. 3, 2004, http://www.washing 
tonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25624-2002Jan10.html (last visited Jan. 18, 2009). 
 11. Harshbarger & Jois, supra note 7, at *8 (2007); Geier, supra note 8. 
 12. See Geier, supra note 8. 
 13. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002). 
 14. Jonathan D. Glater, New Rules Make it Easier to Charge Executives, But Not to 
Send Them to Prison, N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 2005, at C5. 
 15. Id. 
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“veil piercing” provisions were going to be an effective tool for prevent-
ing future scandals and for restoring investor confidence.16 
Six years later, some experts still agree.  “It’s a terrific piece of 
legislation . . . it’s worked very well,” said Chuck Bowsher, former U.S. 
Controller General.17  “We’re in much better shape today than we were 
prior to Sarbanes-Oxley . . . [t]he markets were in turmoil, corporations 
were in disrepute.  There was a real fear that the lack of trust in the mar-
kets could create long-term problems.”18  But across the corporate land-
scape, not everyone agrees with these rosy characterizations.  It appears 
that SOX, particularly Section 302, has not made prosecuting corporate 
officers any easier than it was under traditional veil piercing methods.  
As noted by one observer, “[p]erhaps forcing top executives to certify 
regulatory filings is not quite the fix lawmakers might have expected.”19  
Moreover, some business groups have complained that post-Enron regu-
lation has made American markets less competitive and has driven com-
panies issuing stock to overseas exchanges.20  All this has left many in 
the financial community pondering the question:  What impact did SOX 
have on the financial marketplace? 
Part I of this Article provides a look at the pleading requirements 
and realistic opportunity, or lack thereof, of piercing the corporate veil 
under traditional pre-SOX litigation rules.  Part II examines the impact, 
if any, that SOX has had on litigants’ opportunities to include corporate 
officers as defendants in securities litigation cases.  Part III introduces 
some recent cases where courts, including the Supreme Court, have in-
terpreted the veil piercing provisions in SOX and related regulation.  
Part IV describes the more recent trend to weaken or loosen the regula-
tion based on the perceived or actual impact SOX has had on the securi-
ties industry, while Part V briefly addresses some alternate approaches 
to regulating the securities industry that have been adopted in other 
countries.  Finally, the Article concludes with some suggestions con-
 16. Greg Farrell, Sarbanes-Oxley Has Been a Pretty Clean Sweep, USA TODAY, 
July 30, 2007, at 6B. 
 17. Id. 
 18. Id. (quoting former SEC Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid). 
 19. Glater, supra note 14. 
 20. Stephen Labaton, Is the S.E.C. Changing Course?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2007, 
at C1 (discussing recent comments by Christopher Cox, the SEC Chairman, wherein he 
argued that the tough new regulations were good for competition and were not the 
driving force behind the migration of businesses to European exchanges). 
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not be used lightly.”24 
A.  The Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 and The SEC Rules
cerning the direction regulators and lawmakers should take when 
looking at the U.S. securities industry. 
 
I.  A LOOK AT THE TRADITIONAL PLEADING REQUIREMENTS OR HURDLES 
FACED BY LITIGANTS ATTEMPTING TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL 
Historically, limited liability in the corporate sense meant that 
shareholders were not liable for debts owed to the corporation’s credi-
tors.  The common response in these instances was for the creditor to try 
to bring suit against one or more of the corporation’s shareholders and 
argue that liability should be extended beyond the confines of the corpo-
rate structure directly to the shareholders.21  This is commonly referred 
to as “piercing the corporate veil.”22  Generally, a court considers 
several critical factors when deciding whether or not to pierce the 
corporate shield and impose liability on a shareholder.  These include, 
but are not limited to: defendant’s wrongful dealings with the plaintiff, 
defendant’s abusive dealings with corporate assets, and inadequate 
capitalization.23  Successfully piercing the corporate veil is often 
referred to as a “Herculean task”; courts are not quick to ignore the 
corporate formalities and extend liability directly to shareholders, 
recognizing that “veil piercing is an extraordinary procedure that should 
 
)25 and SEC Rule 10b-
526.  Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act forbids: 
 
Actions seeking to pierce the corporate veil with allegations of se-
curities fraud are typically brought under Section 10(b) of the Securities 
and Exchange Act of 1934 (the “Exchange Act”
 21. Franklin A. Gevurtz, Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of 
Confusion Surrounding the Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil, 76 OR. L. REV. 
853, 853 (1997). 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. at 854. 
 24. Schattner v. Girard, Inc., 668 F.2d 1366, 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1981). 
 25. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(a) (2008). 
 26. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2008). 
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the use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in 
contravention of such rules and regulations as the [SEC] may pre-
scribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest or for the 
protection of investors.27 
SEC Rule 10b-5 implements Section 10(b) by declaring the 
following to be unlawful: 
 
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, 
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit a 
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made 
. . . not misleading, or 
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which 
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any 
person, in connection with the purchase or sale of any 
security.28 
 
Prior to the passage of SOX in 2002, corporate officers could only 
be held personally liable for alleged violations of Section 10(b) or Rule 
10b-5 if a plaintiff could demonstrate that the officer himself committed 
a breach of fiduciary duty sufficient to warrant piercing the corporate 
veil.29  When pleading a securities fraud claim under section 10(b) of the 
Exchange Act and SEC Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff has to allege fraud “with 
particularity” in order to survive a motion to dismiss.30  That is, a plain-
tiff is required to plead that there was:  (1) a misrepresentation or omis-
sion of a material fact; (2) made with scienter; (3) in connection with the 
purchase or sale of a security; (4) relied on by plaintiff; that (5) proxi-
mately caused (6) plaintiff’s economic loss.31  The plaintiff’s claims are 
then subject to review under the heightened standard for fraud claims 
under the Federal Rules and it is widely accepted that generalized or 
conclusory allegations of fraudulent conduct will not satisfy Rule 9(b) of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.32  To satisfy Rule 9(b), a plaintiff 
 27. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b). 
 28. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5. 
 29. See Jeannie Nelson, New Corporate Responsibility Law Increases Liabilities 
for Directors, Officers, and Attorneys, But Does it Increase Protections for Investors?, 
34 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 1165, 1167 (2003). 
 30. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(b). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 341-42 (2005). 
 32. Rule 9(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires that the circum-
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must “specify the alleged fraudulent statements, the speaker, when and 
where the statements were made, and why they are fraudulent.”33  Thus, 
trying to establish fraudulent intent on the part of a corporate officer at 
the pleading stage and before any discovery is nearly impossible. 
B.  The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act 
In 1995, Congress further heightened the pleading standard for 
securities fraud claims by passing the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act (“PSLRA”).34  Under the PSLRA, a plaintiff is required to 
“state with particularity, facts giving rise to a strong inference that the 
defendant acted with the required state of mind” necessary to prove 
fraud.35  “State of mind”, or scienter, is a “mental state embracing intent 
to deceive, manipulate or defraud.”36  That is, a plaintiff must plead a 
“strong inference that the defendant[s] acted at least recklessly” in mak-
ing false statements, or with knowledge of their falsity.37  Recklessness 
under the PSLRA is “a mental state apart from negligence and akin to 
conscious disregard.”38 Typically, litigants would surmise that proof that 
the corporation’s financial statements were false would be enough to 
establish intent. Courts, however, have routinely held that subsequent 
revelations that financial statements were false could not, standing 
alone, create this strong inference of scienter.39 
One could certainly make the claim that the aforementioned hodge-
podge of regulation can be confusing.  Not only have these requirements 
made pleading securities fraud more difficult for plaintiffs, but in 
passing the PSLRA, Congress also muddied the waters by not defining 
the terms “scienter” or “strong inference”.  It appears that these terms 
were deliberately left undefined; Congress stated it did not intend to 
 
stances constituting the fraud must be pled with particularity. 
 33. Fin. Acquisition Partners LP v. Blackwell, 440 F.3d 278, 287 (5th Cir. 2006). 
 34. 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(A). 
 35. Id. § 78u-4(b)(2) (emphasis added). 
 36. In re Comshare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 183 F.3d 542, 548 (6th Cir. 1999) (citing Ernst 
& Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976)). 
 37. Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 38. In re Comshare, 183 F.3d at 550. 
 39. In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. Sec. Litig., 436 F. Supp. 2d 873, 896 (N.D. 
Ohio 2006) (holding that the plaintiffs could not impute such knowledge sufficient to 
establish scienter to the individual defendants merely because they certified the finan-
cial statements). 
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codify how these standards should be met.40  After the PSLRA was 
passed in the House of Representatives, the Senate attempted to amend it 
to include a provision that recognized motive and opportunity as a basis 
for liability so that litigants would better understand what they needed to 
do to meet the pleading requirements for securities fraud.41  Ultimately 
this amendment was not adopted and President Clinton vetoed the bill, 
claiming it erected a “higher barrier for litigants” to bringing suit than 
what was currently in existence and would result in “even the most 
aggrieved investors with the most painful losses” having their cases dis-
missed at the pleading stage.42  Despite these concerns, Congress over-
rode the veto and the PSLRA was enacted without the amendment pro-
posed by the Senate. 
There has been some non-legislative guidance to interpreting the 
terms “strong inference” and “scienter.”  Prior to the passage of the 
PSLRA, the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held 
that pleading a “strong inference” of scienter could be established by 
showing that:  (1) the defendant acted recklessly; (2) the defendant had 
the motive and opportunity to commit fraud;43 or (3) the defendant, a 
corporate insider, “misrepresented to the public material facts about the 
corporation’s performance or prospects in order to keep the stock price 
artificially high.”44 While this interpretation aided litigants in the Second 
Circuit, however, it was not the interpretation used by all courts.  In fact, 
the circuit courts have split on these definitions, with the Ninth Circuit 
raising the scienter element to require strong evidence of deliberately 
reckless or conscious misconduct.45  The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, in 
contrast, have taken the middle road between the Second and Ninth 
Circuits, holding that a showing of motive and opportunity alone are not 
sufficient to meet the scienter requirement.46 
 40. H.R. Rep. No. 104-369 (1995). 
 41. Helwig, 251 F.3d at 549 (citing 141 Cong. Rec. S9171 (daily ed. June 27, 1995) 
(statement of Sen. Spector)). 
 42. 141 Cong. Rec. S19035 (daily ed. Dec. 21, 1995) (veto message of President 
Clinton). 
 43. Acito v. IMCERA Group, Inc., 47 F.3d 47, 52 (2d Cir. 1995). 
 44. Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 307-8 (2d Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 
1012 (2000). 
 45. In re Silicon Graphics Litig., 183 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 46. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1287 (11th Cir. 1999); Garfield 
v. NDC Health Corp., 466 F.3d 1255, 1265-66 (11th Cir. 2006) (holding that the plain 
meaning of language contained in the Sarbanes-Oxley Act does not indicate any intent 
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II.  HAVE THE PLEADING REQUIREMENTS FOR FRAUD BEEN IMPACTED BY 
THE PASSAGE OF SARBANES-OXLEY? 
Post Sarbanes-Oxley, the SEC and investors were expected to have 
a much greater ability to hold a corporation’s officers accountable for 
financial and accounting misdeeds.  Under Section 302 of Sarbanes-
Oxley, CEOs and CFOs are required to personally certify every annual 
or quarterly report that the company files with the SEC under Sections 
13(a) or 15(d) of the Exchange Act47.  This certification process is meant 
to provide evidence that the officer reviewed the report and that to the 
best of that officer’s knowledge, the report does not contain any untrue 
statements or omissions of material fact, and that the information in the 
report fairly represents in all material respects the financial condition of 
the corporation.  The rule requires that the principal financial officer 
must certify to his or her knowledge that: 
 
(1) the signing officer has reviewed the report; 
(2) the report does not contain any untrue statement of material 
fact; 
(3) that the financial information fairly presents in all material 
respects the financial condition of the issuer; 
(4) that the signing officer is responsible for: 
(a) establishing and maintaining internal controls of the 
company; 
(b) that those controls have been designed to ensure that 
material information relating to the company is 
known to the officers and others; and 
(c) that they have evaluated effectiveness of those 
controls; and 
(5) that the signing officers have disclosed to the auditors and 
audit committee: 
(a) any significant deficiencies in the design or operation 
of the internal controls; 
to change the pleading requirements for pleading scienter set forth in the PSLRA and 
that section 302 certifications are only probative of scienter if the person signing them 
was severely reckless). 
 47. 15 U.S.C. § 7241(a) (2008). 
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(b) any fraud whether or not material that involved man-
agement or other employees who have a significant 
role in the issuer’s internal controls; and 
(c) any significant changes in the internal controls.48 
 
Violations of Section 302 may lead to civil liability for failing to 
meet SOX reporting requirements.49  Additionally, violations finding 
material misstatements or omissions concerning the company’s financial 
status that subsequently mislead investors may give birth to a cause of 
action brought by either the SEC or private investors50. 
Section 906 of Sarbanes-Oxley requires that the reporting corporate 
manager certify in a written statement that each report submitted to the 
SEC contains information that is a fair representation of the corpora-
tion’s financial status.  A knowing violation of this certification provi-
sion can result in 10 years in imprisonment and a $1 million fine.51  A 
willful violation would be punishable by up to 20 years imprisonment 
and a $5 million fine.52 
Thus, in essence Sections 302 and 906 were intended to be a codi-
fication of the “piercing the corporate veil” doctrine by requiring a cor-
porate officer to expose himself to civil and criminal liability by certify-
ing that he was directly responsible for the content of the SEC filings.  
These provisions were intended to make it easier for litigants and prose-
cutors to get to the individual officers responsible for the fraud.  In fact, 
as noted by one decision, the signing of the Sarbanes-Oxley certifica-
tions gives rise to an inference of scienter because the certifications 
evince the officer’s state of mind and establish that the corporate officer 
knew or should have known about the improper financial reporting.53  
Securities experts have acknowledged that the certification provisions 
were designed to prevent top executives from using a “head in the sand” 
defense to actions alleging securities fraud committed on their watch.54  
 48. Id.; see also Jenny B. Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley: Determining How to 
Comply with the New Federal Disclosure Law for Corporations Won’t Be Easy, 89 
A.B.A.J. 44 (Feb. 2003). 
 49. See Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 48. 
 50. Id. 
 51. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(c)(1) (2002). 
 52. Id. 
 53. See In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp., Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 262, 
*50 (D. Or. 2006). 
 54. See Davis, Sorting Out Sarbanes-Oxley, supra note 48. 
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Indeed, a statement from the SEC warned corporate officers that submit-
ting a signed false certification under SOX could expose them to both 
Commission and private actions for violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 
10b-5.55 
Along with the above, Section 101 of SOX required the formation 
of the Public Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).56  The PCAOB 
was charged with overseeing the audits of public companies in an effort 
to provide additional assurances that the interests of investors were 
served by the generation of informative, fair, and independent audit 
reports.57  The PCAOB is a non-profit private-sector corporation com-
prised of a five-member board appointed by the SEC after consultation 
with the Chairman of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System and the Secretary of the Treasury.  Only two of the five Board 
members must be, or must have been, certified public accountants and 
all members of the Board serve on a full-time basis.58  The PCAOB has 
the power to:  (1) establish or adopt ethics regulations and standards re-
lating to the preparation of audit reports, (2) perform inspections of pub-
lic accounting firms, (3) conduct investigations, hold disciplinary hear-
ings, and impose sanctions, and (4) enforce compliance with the others 
provisions of SOX.59 
One could easily believe that, in light of the above, corporate 
executives would be less likely to get away with certifying false or 
fraudulent financial information to the SEC and/or public.  Nevertheless, 
the question remains – is submitting a false certification under Section 
10(b) of SOX and SEC Rule 10b-5 enough to prove scienter and to 
enable a litigant to pierce the corporate veil?  The question appears to be 
a difficult one to answer with any degree of certainty.  The federal cir-
cuit courts are split into three different camps when it comes to deter-
mining what exactly is required to satisfy the PSLRA’s pleading require-
ments for scienter.  The split is as follows:  one camp consists solely of 
the Ninth Circuit; another is comprised of the Second and Third 
 55. Certification of Disclosure in Companies’ Quarterly and Annual Reports, 
Securities Act Release No. 8124, at 34 (Aug. 29, 2002). 
 56. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(a) (2002). 
 57. Sabyasachi Ghoshray, Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley on Multiple Listed 
Corporations: Conflicts in Comparative Corporate Laws and Possible Remedies, 10 
ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 447, 450 (Spring 2004). 
 58. 15 U.S.C. § 7211(e)(1)-(3). 
 59. Id. 
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Circuits; and the last and largest camp encompasses the First, Fourth, 
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits.60 
The Ninth Circuit has set forth the strictest interpretation of the 
pleading standard in the case of In re Silicon Graphics Inc. Securities 
Litigation.61  The court held that, at a minimum, a plaintiff must plead 
“particular facts giving rise to a strong inference of deliberate or 
conscious recklessness.”62  The Ninth Circuit’s holding has been de-
scribed as creating a “super-recklessness” standard, which has been criti-
cized as being too restrictive by other circuit courts.63 
Conversely, the Second and Third Circuits have employed what can 
be characterized as the most pro-plaintiff standard in the country.64  The 
Second and Third Circuits agree that “plaintiffs must allege facts show-
ing (a) both motive and opportunity, or (b) strong circumstantial evi-
dence of conscious misbehavior or recklessness.”65 
Sitting somewhere in the middle between the two extremes are the 
eight remaining circuits.  While there is not a pure consistency among 
these eight circuits, it is fair to say they agree that, as a general rule, 
pleading motive and opportunity alone is not sufficient to demonstrate 
 60. Mark Gideon, Accounting Fraud: Pleading Scienter of Auditors Under the 
PSLRA, 39 Conn. L. Rev. 1097, 1159 (2007) (noting that the D.C. Circuit itself has not 
yet weighed in on the subject but that there have been some District Court opinions 
from the D.C. Circuit). 
 61. In re Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d 970, 979 (9th Cir. 1999); see also Gompper v. 
VISX, Inc., 298 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2002); DSAM Global Value Fund v. Altris Software, 
Inc., 288 F.3d 385 (9th Cir. 2002). 
 62. Silicon Graphics, 183 F.3d at 979 (emphasis added). 
 63. Bryant v. Avado Brands, Inc., 187 F.3d 1271, 1284 n.21 (11th Cir. 1999) 
(stating that “[t]o the extent that the effort in Silicon Graphics is an attempt to import 
into the law a new and uncertain super-recklessness, we believe that the attempt is 
inconsistent with the plain statutory language”) (citation omitted). 
 64. Ryan G. Miest, Would the Real Scienter Please Stand Up: The Effect of the 
Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 on Pleading Securities Fraud, 82 
MINN. L. REV. 1103, 1133 (1998) (positing that eliminating the use of “motive and 
opportunity test” employed by the Second Circuit does not hamper the private enforce-
ment function of 10b-5 actions, rather, the increased difficulty of pleading scienter 
without utilizing the motive and opportunity test may result in fewer claims filed and 
those plaintiffs who are dissuaded by a stronger standard are precisely the litigants the 
PSLRA was enacted to deter). 
 65. Rombach v. Chang, 355 F.3d 164, 176 (2d Cir. 2004); Kemp v. Universal Am. 
Fin. Corp., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2162, at 32 (S.D.N.Y. 2007); In re Advanta Corp. 
Sec. Litig., 180 F.3d 525, 532 (3d Cir. 1999); In re Alpharma Inc. Sec. Litig., 372 F.3d 
137, 148 (3d Cir. 2004). 
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scienter, and that a plaintiff must also provide facts sufficient to support 
a strong inference of recklessness.66 
The split among the circuits is only the “tip of the iceberg” when it 
comes to the problem of ascertaining what precisely a plaintiff must do 
to establish scienter.  The federal district courts are even more erratic 
than the circuit courts when it comes to addressing the PSLRA’s “strong 
inference” of scienter.  As noted in a 2002 study of 167 district rulings 
regarding the issue, researchers found “aggregate patterns of behavior 
that are, to a remarkable degree, statistically indistinguishable from a 
‘coin-toss’ model of judicial behavior.”67  The authors of the study posit 
that: 
judges who are unconstrained by appellate precedent frequently 
adopt minimalist strategies that avoid the need to interpret the 
statute. They rule either that a complaint is sufficiently strong that it 
satisfies the most stringent conceivable articulation of the pleading 
standard, or that it is so deficient that it fails the most forgiving 
articulation, without explaining how the ‘strong inference’ standard 
is to be interpreted or applied.68 
In August of 2007, for example, the United States District Court for 
the Northern District of Ohio, Western Division, held that the signing of 
 66. In re Cabletron Systems, Inc., 311 F.3d 11, 39 (1st Cir. 2002) (holding that 
motive and opportunity alone are not sufficient to plead scienter without a combination 
of facts and circumstances indicating fraudulent intent); see also Ottmann v. Hanger 
Orthopedic Group, 353 F.3d 338, 345 (4th Cir. 2003); Abrams v. Baker Hughes, Inc., 
292 F.3d 424, 438 (5th Cir. 2002); Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 551 (6th Cir. 
2001); Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 601 (7th Cir. 2006); 
In re Navarre Corp. Sec. Litig., 299 F.3d 735, 747-48 (8th Cir. 2002); City of 
Philadelphia v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d 1245, 1249 (10th Cir. 2001); Bryant, 187 F.3d 
at 1285. 
 67. Joseph A. Grundfest & A.C. Pritchard, Statues with Multiple Personality 
Disorders: The Value of Ambiguity in Statutory Design and Interpretation, 54 STAN. L. 
REV. 627, 678 (2002). 
District court judges who interpret the “strong inference” provision generate aggregate 
patterns of behavior that are, to a remarkable degree, statistically indistinguishable 
from a “coin-toss” model of judicial behavior. In this coin-toss model, the judge first 
flips a coin to determine whether the Second Circuit standard prevails or whether 
Congress intended to adopt a more stringent standard. If a more stringent standard 
applies then the judge tosses the coin again to decide between the Intermediate 
standard and the Ninth Circuit standard. 
Id. 
 68. Id. 
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SOX certification reports by the CEO and board chairman, which con-
tained financial mistakes that ultimately had a “large impact” on the 
value of the corporation’s shares, was insufficient to plead scienter with-
out a showing that the reports were “intentionally misleading.”69  The 
court arrived at this holding despite the facts that:  (i) over a period of 
approximately 18 months, the corporation’s income had been overstated 
by as much as 70%, (ii) the corporation actually lost $1.27 billion 
instead of earning approximately $920 million as previously reported, 
and (iii) the corporation filed for bankruptcy while the chairman an-
nounced his retirement and the CEO received a generous bonus to stay 
on and guide the corporation through bankruptcy.70 
In March 2007, the Northern District Court of California went a 
step further and held that a SOX certification containing false declara-
tions that financial statements comply with generally accepted account-
ing principles is not independently actionable under Section 10(b) or 
Rule 10b-5 but may be used merely as an “inference of scienter.”71  In 
fact, the court in that case noted that there was “nothing in either the 
1934 Securities Exchange Act or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and imple-
menting regulations that authorizes plaintiffs to base a claim for securi-
ties fraud on an alleged misstatement in a Sarbanes-Oxley certifica-
tion.”72 
In an even more troubling case, the District Court for the District of 
Colorado not only avoided answering the scienter question, but also 
declared that Sections 302 and 906 of SOX do not even grant parties a 
private right of action against corporate officers.73  In Srebnik v. Dean, a 
group of shareholders brought an action pursuant to Sections 302 and 
906 of SOX against several officers of Miller Diversified Corp., a cattle 
feedlot public company in Colorado, and Anderson & Whitney, the 
corporation’s auditors and preparers of the proxy statement relating to an 
unlawful and fraudulent acquisition of business assets.  The defendants 
were accused of submitting false SOX certifications to the SEC and of 
“loot[ing] assets through concealed off-the-books payments, sham loans 
and other bogus transactions including the fraudulent acquisition of a 
 69. Frank v. Dana Corp., 525 F. Supp. 2d 922, 930 (N.D. Ohio 2007). 
 70. Id. at 926. 
 71. See In re Silicon Storage Tech., Inc. Sec. Litig., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21953, 
at *52 (N.D. Calif. 2007). 
 72. Id. at *51. 
 73. Srebnik v. Dean, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 73836, at *19 (Colo. 2006). 
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business for a promissory note issued by an insolvent company.”74  
Surprisingly, the court dismissed the shareholders’ complaint, stating 
that there was no judicial authority addressing the availability of a 
private right of action under Sections 302 and 906 of SOX75 and that the 
text of these sections “do not contain any ‘rights creating’ language or 
other indication that Congress intended to create a private right of action 
in favor of a class of shareholders for violations of these provisions.”76 
Conversely, one Louisiana District Court in December 2006 point-
ed out that there was only one case in which a District Court (in Oregon) 
found that a certification executed by a corporate officer pursuant to 
Section 302 of SOX supports an inference of scienter against the certify-
ing defendant.77  In In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp., that court elabo-
rated on its analysis of whether certification alone supports scienter by 
noting that some commentators have argued that: 
when a corporate officer certifies a company’s financial reports, the 
company’s later revelation that the reports contained material false 
statements can support an inference that the officer either knew or 
was reckless about the false statements, by virtue of the company’s 
disclosure controls, or that he knew or was reckless in not knowing 
that the company’s disclosure controls were inadequate.78 
In the end, however, the Louisiana court held that SOX certifi-
cations, alone, would not support a strong enough inference of 
ter.79 
What did this jumble of inconsistent precedents mean for litigants? 
At the narrowest level, these cases suggested that the questions present-
ed by the “strong inference” debate were ripe for Supreme Court review 
in order to resolve the split among the circuits and hopefully eliminate 
the divergence in the district courts.  A Supreme Court decision, it was 
hoped, could establish a co
 74. Id. at *5. 
 75. Id. at *17. 
 76. Id. at *18. 
 77. In re OCA, Inc. Sec. and Derivative Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90854, at 
*72 (D. La. 2006) (citing In re Lattice Semiconductor Corp. Sec. Litig., 2006 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 262 (D. Or. 2006)). 
 78. Id. at *74. 
 79. Id. at *75. 
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III.  THE U. S. SUPREME COURT WEIGHS IN WITH ITS DECISION  
IN TELLABS, INC. V. MAKOR ISSUES AND RIGHTS 
Despite the split in the Circuits, it is clear that some form of fraudu-
lent intent is required.  In order to clarify this issue for all litigants, 
regardless of jurisdiction, the Supreme Court declared that a mental state 
embracing intent to deceive, manipulate or defraud is an essential ele-
ment of a Section 10(b) or Rule 10b-5 claim.80  In essence, a plaintiff-
shareholder must set forth facts in support of his allegations of fraud, as 
well as provide support for allegations of the required state of mind – 
that is, facts creating a strong inference of scienter.81  On June 21, 2007, 
the Supreme Court further addressed how to treat an examination of the 
pleading requirements in a Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 action and 
specifically how to define a “strong inference” of scienter.82  In Tellabs, 
Inc., the Court held that when determining the existence of a strong 
inference of scienter, courts must consider the complaint in its entirety, 
as well as documents incorporated into the complaint by reference (such 
as SOX certifications) and should conclude that an inference of scienter 
has as much plausibility as inferences to the contrary.83  That is, when 
the allegations of fraud are accepted as true and taken collectively, a 
reasonable person must deem the inference of scienter at least as strong 
as any opposing inference.84  Thus, the inference of scienter must be 
cogent and compelling in light of other explanations. 
Tellabs is a manufacturer of specialized equipment for fiber optic 
networks.85  The shareholders of Tellabs alleged that Richard Notebaert, 
the CEO and president, engaged in a scheme to deceive investors about 
the true value of Tellabs stock.86  Notebaert was accused of:  (1) falsely 
asserting in January of 2001 that the demand for the company’s flagship 
networking device was continuing to grow, (2) stating that the com-
pany’s financial results were stronger than they actually were, and (3) 
grossly overstating revenue projections.87  In a December 2000 press 
release, Notebaert had declared that Tellabs had “record sales and 
 80. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976). 
 81. Helwig v. Vencor, Inc., 251 F.3d 540, 565 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 82. See Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2509 (2007). 
 83. Id. at 2509-10. 
 84. Id. at 2511. 
 85. Id. at 2505. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
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earnings in the fourth quarter of 2000,” and announced that “customers 
are buying more and more Tellabs equipment.”88  Notebaert later in-
formed financial analysts that Tellabs had “set the stage for sustained 
growth with the successful launches of several products,” and in January 
of 2001 he further elaborated that demand for their latest product, the 
TITAN 6500, was exceeding expectations and that they felt “very, very 
good about the robust growth we’re experiencing.”89 
Later, in February of 2001, a letter signed by Notebaert was sent to 
stockholders wherein it was stated that Tellabs’s growth was robust, its 
markets held significant potential for sustained growth, its core business 
was performing well, and that sales of the TITAN 6500 were up 56% in 
2000.90  The first sign of trouble appeared in March of 2001 when 
Tellabs unexpectedly reduced its first quarter sales projections.  Simul-
taneously, however, Notebaert reiterated the company’s positive fore-
casts by declaring that demand for its core products remained strong.91  
This pattern of reducing sales projections while announcing strong 
interest in products continued for several months.  Finally, on June 19, 
2001, Tellabs announced that projected sales for the second quarter 
would be almost $300 million less than originally projected.92  The next 
day, Tellabs’ stock price plummeted from $38 a share to $15.87 a 
share.93  This drop was on top of the initial drop in stock price from $67 
that occurred around March of 2001.94  In a five-month span, therefore, 
the stock price went from $67 to $15.87 a share.  In December of 2002, 
shareholders filed suit against Tellabs and ten executives in the District 
Court for the Northern District of Illinois.95  The complaint alleged that 
Tellabs stock was artificially inflated causing market analysts to con-
tinue to recommend that investors buy that stock.96  The complaint was 
dismissed on several grounds, including a finding that “the complaint 
failed to adequately allege that the defendants’ conduct met the scienter 
 88. See Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs, Inc., 437 F.3d 588, 592 (7th Cir. 
2006). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 593. 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 127 S. Ct. 2499, 2505 (2007). 
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standard for securities fraud, which requires that they intended ‘to 
deceive, manipulate, or defraud.’”97 
“In July of 2003, the plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint, 
bolstering their allegations with references to 27 confidential sources, 
shortening the list of defendants by four, eliminating a few of their 
weaker claims, and adding more specific scienter allegations against 
each of the remaining defendants.”98  After the District Court again dis-
missed the complaint, the shareholders appealed to the Seventh Circuit 
Court of Appeals which reversed in part, finding that the shareholders 
“had pleaded the misleading character of Notebaert’s statements with 
sufficient particularity.”99  Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, however, the 
Seventh Circuit also determined that they had failed to allege that 
Notebaert acted with scienter.100  The shareholders then appealed to the 
United States Supreme Court. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Ginsburg established a three-part 
test for evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss a securities fraud 
claim.  First, courts must “accept all factual allegations in the complaint 
as true.”101  Second, courts should not scrutinize any individual allega-
tion in isolation, but rather should “consider the complaint in its entirety, 
as well as other sources courts ordinarily examine when ruling on Rule 
12(b)(6) motions to dismiss, in particular, documents incorporated into 
the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take 
judicial notice.”102  Justice Ginsburg reiterated that the analysis must be 
of “all of the facts alleged, taken collectively” to determine if there is a 
strong inference of scienter.103  Third, in making that determination of 
whether “the pleaded facts give rise to a ‘strong’ inference of scienter, 
the court must take into account plausible opposing inferences.”104  
Justice Ginsburg further articulated this three-part analysis by stating 
that “the strength of an inference cannot be decided in a vacuum.”105  
Instead, a court must consider “nonculpable explanations for the defend-
 97. Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 593 (citing Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 
185, 194 (1976)). 
 98. Id. at 594; see also Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2506. 
 99. Tellabs, 127 S. Ct. at 2506 (citing Makor Issues, 437 F.3d at 595-600). 
 100. Id. at 2509. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 2510. 
2009 SARBANES-OXLEY GAVE PRIVATE 433 
LITIGANTS A “DULL SWORD”  
 
ant’s conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff.”106  Some may 
argue that the majority was attempting to swing the pendulum back 
toward the plaintiffs; Justice Ginsburg pointed out that the inference set 
forth by the plaintiffs need not be of the “smoking gun” nature or even 
“the most plausible of competing interests.”107  Rather, the Court held 
that a complaint would be defeated by a motion to dismiss unless “a 
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at 
least as compelling as any opposing inference one could draw from the 
facts alleged.”108 
In a nutshell, the Supreme Court instructed lower courts to accept 
the allegations set forth in the complaint as true, and then determine if a 
reasonable person would find that the inference of scienter is at least as 
strong as any competing interest.  Thus, “if the answer to this analysis is 
no, then the inference is not ‘strong’ under the PSLRA.”109 
In reality, the decision in Tellabs “strengthens the pleading standard 
set forth by Congress in the PSLRA, and creates a uniformly high bar 
for pleading scienter in securities fraud cases.”110 As a result, the Tellabs 
case further supports the existing hurdles erected to make it difficult for 
plaintiffs who hope to sustain a securities fraud claim. 
Thus, after Tellabs, practitioners and scholars must acknowledge 
that perhaps forcing top executives to certify regulatory filings pursuant 
to SOX is not quite the solution to the corporate financial scandal prob-
lem that Congress or investors had hoped for.  The certification require-
ment may still be a powerful incentive for corporate executives to do the 
right thing, but its power is diminished by the additional requirement 
that a plaintiff must still establish a strong inference of scienter at the 
pleading stage.  Thus, the certification requirement alone is not the sharp 
veil piercing tool it was originally thought to be.  The requirement that 
an officer sign a certification form will likely work to deter some, but 
not others.  In fact, many lawyers have been advising executives not to 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. (emphasis added). 
 109. JONATHAN C. DICKEY, PRACTISING LAW INST., SECURITIES LITIGATION AND 
ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2007: CURRENT TRENDS IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LITIGATION 
28 (Oct. 15, 2007), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/ 
Dickey-SecuritiesLitigationAndEnforcementInstitute2007.pdf. 
 110. Id. at 30. 
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focus too much on the certification requirement, “telling them that it’s 
not a new and unique liability that’s been imposed.”111 
As for the concern over the apparent increase in exposure to claims 
faced by auditing firms, there seems to be less of a cause for alarm than 
originally feared.  With the exception of Arthur Andersen, the number of 
class actions against auditing firms has actually decreased in the past 
two years.112  Simultaneously, those claims that have been initiated have 
largely been dismissed due to the heightened pleading standards estab-
lished under the PSLRA.113  It appears that there is no greater risk faced 
by auditors than that faced by corporate executives. 
IV.  A LOOK AT THE RECENT TREND TO PROVIDE ADDITIONAL 
PROTECTIONS FOR CORPORATIONS, THEIR OFFICERS/DIRECTORS,  
AND AUDITING FIRMS 
“For the first time since [Sarbanes-Oxley] was enacted in 2001, 
there seems to be mounting concern that the pendulum has swung too far 
towards ‘over regulation’ in the wake of the collapse of Enron, 
Worldcom, Adelphia, and other companies . . . .”114  Despite the diffi-
culties faced by litigants who attempt to pierce the corporate veil with 
the dull sword provided by Sarbanes-Oxley, some industry groups are 
taking a look at the current legislation and are drafting proposals to 
provide corporations and accounting firms with a new shield against 
both criminal penalties and civil lawsuits.  As noted in one article in the 
New York Times, “two influential industry groups . . . are hoping to 
swing the regulatory pendulum in the opposite direction.”115  The aim of 
these groups appears to be threefold: (1) to limit the liability of 
accounting firms; (2) to reduce the number of lawsuits brought by 
shareholders; and, (3) to narrow the focus of prosecutors toward the 
 111. See Glater, supra note 14, at 5. 
 112. Gideon, Accounting Fraud, supra note 60, at 1104 (noting that class action 
filings in 2006 declined 38% from 2005 and were 43% lower than the 10-year average). 
 113. See Ezra Charitable Trust v. Tyco Int’l, Ltd., 466 F.3d 1, 33 (1st Cir. 2006) 
(dismissing the claims against PricewaterhouseCoopers and holding that the accounting 
restatements were not enough to establish scienter under the PSLRA pleading 
requirements). 
 114. DICKEY, supra note 109, at 2. 
 115. Stephen Labaton, Businesses Seek New Protection on Legal Front, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 29, 2006, at 1. 
2009 SARBANES-OXLEY GAVE PRIVATE 435 
LITIGANTS A “DULL SWORD”  
 
individual violators instead of prosecuting whole companies.116  In 
addition, these groups aim to reduce the burdens imposed by Sarbanes-
Oxley and to provide the SEC with broader discretion on the interpre-
tation and enforcement fronts.  Support has grown for these proposals – 
particularly after the Supreme Court overturned the obstruction of 
justice conviction of Arthur Andersen in connection with its shredding 
of Enron-related documents.117 
The vindication of Arthur Andersen came too late to save the firm 
from collapse, but it did prompt commentators to acknowledge that 
preemptively limiting the exposure for auditing firms, and corporations 
in general, would make the likelihood of a future major accounting firm 
collapse significantly less likely.  Some of the reforms that are being 
considered which are specifically aimed at protecting accounting in-
clude:  (1) creating safe harbors for certain defined auditing practices, 118 
(2) setting a cap on auditor liability in certain circumstances, and clarify-
ing and limiting auditor’s duties under Section 10A,119 (3) restricting 
criminal penalties against firms as opposed to individual auditing part-
ners,120 and (4) granting regulators specific powers to appoint monitors 
to oversee operations of audit firms found to have engaged in systematic 
failures in process, management, or personnel.121 
As noted by Conrad Hewitt, Chief Accountant for the SEC, 
accounting firms are the final target in many of these lawsuits because 
the company at issue no longer has the resources to satisfy a judg-
ment.122  Hewitt also noted that: 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Stephen Labaton, S.E.C. Seeks to Curtail Investor Suits, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
13, 2007, at C1 (discussing the SEC’s plans to protect corporations, executives, and 
accounting firms from investor lawsuits). 
 119. Id.; Conrad Hewitt, Chief Accountant, U.S. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, Remarks 
to the Practising Law Institute’s SEC Speaks Series (Feb. 9, 2007), available at 
http://www.sec.gov./news/speech/2007/spch020907cwh.htm. 
 120. Labaton, supra note 115. 
 121. Jonathan C. Dickey, Auditor Liability “Caps” – The Politics of Catastrophe, 5 
SEC. LITIG. REP. 5 (Nov. 2008), available at http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/ 
Documents/Dickey-AuditorLiabilityCaps.pdf (citing the Paulson Committee Report). 
 122. See Hewitt, supra note 119 (stating that large accounting firms are often the 
“deep pocket” litigants pursue to recover losses). 
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the issue does not appear to be the number of meritless lawsuits that 
are filed, but the fact that potential claims against major accounting 
firms can be so large that a judgment in any one case might force a 
firm into bankruptcy and result in further consolidation of the audit 
profession with fewer firms.123 
He concluded by suggesting that the accounting profession propose 
to Congress that reasonable limits be placed on auditing firms’ exposure 
to liability for violations of federal securities regulations, in much the 
same way liability has been limited for other professions in the U.S. and 
in Europe124. 
Commentators have also proposed changes that would direct 
prosecutors to seek redress from the individuals actually responsible for 
the securities violations rather than corporations as a whole.125  While on 
first blush this may seem appealing, a persuasive opposing argument 
exists; in large corporations it is often very difficult for prosecutors and 
shareholders to ferret out evidence that pinpoints the specific persons 
involved with the fraudulent activities. 
Responding to these arguments, SOX proponents counter that the 
proposed reforms are misguided responses to a false alarm.  According 
to some studies, SOX has not had the effect of significantly increasingly 
the number of securities claims.126  Such results suggest that there does 
not appear to be a need to loosen regulation.  Moreover, opponents of 
the groups seeking SOX revisions believe certain suggested revisions 
would “dramatically diminish the effectiveness of the S.E.C., of criminal 
enforcement, of state attorney general enforcement, and of private 
damage actions . . . .”127 
However, in the author’s view, some of the groups’ proposals to 
amend SOX do have merit.  Proposals seeking to direct certain disputes 
to arbitration, or to judges rather than juries, and limiting the liability of 
accounting firms to prevent further shrinkage in the industry have some 
validity and warrant further investigation. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Id.; see infra Section V. 
 125. Labaton, supra note 115. 
 126. Roger Russell, Facing the Storm: Planning and SOX Worrying Insurers, 
ACCOUNTING TODAY, July 26, 2004 – Aug. 8, 2004 (quoting Ken Mackunis, president 
of Aon Insurance Services, the administrator for the American Institute of CPAs 
Professional Liability Insurance Program). 
 127. See Floyd Norris & Stephen Labaton, Panel Urging Rewriting Rules to Aid 
Companies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2006, at 2. 
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V.  HOW HAS EUROPE HANDLED SECURITIES FRAUD ISSUES? 
In light of the challenges facing lawmakers, corporate officers, and 
accounting firms in the United States, it is relevant to consider how 
these issues are being dealt with abroad.  In Europe, the debate has been 
focused on the accounting industry and the risks posed to it by excessive 
and burdensome litigation.  Indeed, experts in the United States concur 
and have expressed concern over the severity of this issue.  In particular, 
the collapse of Arthur Andersen has provoked major worldwide concern 
over the status of the accounting industry.  A recent spate of studies and 
reports express concern over the fragile state of the Industry and of the 
remaining “Big Four” firms that dominate it.128  The number of barriers 
to entry facing mid-sized auditing firms diminishes the likelihood that 
new competition will challenge these four major firms.129  Meanwhile, 
even the “Big Four” are finding it difficult to endure while laboring un-
der the constant risk of potentially fatal litigation.130  One study reports 
that “[t]he profession is already viewed as increasingly less attractive 
and risky . . . .” and that “[a] major claim that threatens the survival of a 
firm would simply reinforce the negative perceptions about the 
profession.”131  Further, experts predict that the collapse of one or more 
of the “Big Four” firms could have catastrophic consequences for capital 
markets.132 
In response to this problem, countries in the European Union have 
begun debating the merits of widespread caps on auditor liability.  Under 
a liability cap, the possible recovery against auditing firms would be 
limited either to a fixed amount, or by a formula that takes into account 
 128. DIRECTORATE GEN. FOR INTERNAL MKT. & SERVS., CONSULTATION ON 
AUDITORS’ LIABILITY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE EUROPEAN CAPITAL MARKETS 
(COMMISION STAFF WORKING PAPER, Jan. 2007), available at http://ec.europa.eu/inter 
nal_market/auditing/docs/liability/consultation-paper_en.pdf [hereinafter COMMISSION 
PAPER]. 
 129. Id. at 8-9. 
 130. Id. at 9. 
 131. See LONDON ECONOMICS, STUDY ON THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF AUDITORS’ 
LIABILITY REGIMES 209-10 (Sept. 2006), available at http://ec.europa.eu/internal_ 
market/auditing/docs/liability/auditors-final-report_en.pdf [hereinafter LONDON ECON-
OMICS STUDY]. 
 132. AccountingWEB.co.uk, EU Audit Liability Cap Looks Likely, http://www. 
accountingweb.co.uk/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=169456&d=1025&h=1024&f=1026 (last visi-
ted Jan. 18, 2009). 
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certain factors.133  Proponents put forth several different policies that 
would be advanced by capping liability. Major policy rationales include:  
protecting capital markets from the potentially devastating collapse of a 
major auditing firm,134 lowering the barriers to entry for competition by 
middle-tier firms,135 and making the size of future claims more predict-
able so as to improve the insurability of audit activity.136  Additionally, 
such caps may help prevent the “deepest pockets” syndrome described 
by Hewitt.137  This occurs when plaintiffs, seeking a large recovery, shift 
liability onto the auditing firm even when it may be responsible for only 
a small portion of the wrongdoing.138  Of course, liability caps are not 
without their critics, who claim that such caps may reduce the quality of 
audits.139 
A recent European Commission Working Paper contained several 
methods of remedying the problem of over-litigation, listing as the most 
straightforward method the imposition of an absolute cap on auditor 
liability.140  This approach has already been employed in some countries, 
and is relatively simple: it imposes a fixed monetary cap on the recovery 
that may be sought by an injured plaintiff against an auditing firm.141  
This “one size fits all” approach is inflexible, however, and it would be 
difficult to calculate the exact level at which to cap liability.142  A 
modified version of this approach could help alleviate some of these 
drawbacks by offering a variable cap on liability.  For example, the cap 
could be set according to the size of the company being audited143 or by 
the fees that the auditing firm charges the company.144 
 133. Id. 
 134. LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY, supra note 131, at 185. 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 128, at 7; see Hewitt, supra note 119. 
 138. LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY, supra note 131, at 186; COMMISSION PAPER, 
supra note 128, at 7. 
 139. Penny Sukhraj, Big Four Gains Support on Liability Argument, ACCOUNTANCY 
AGE, Oct. 12, 2006. 
 140. COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 128, at 12. 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. (“If such a cap were set too high, mid-tier audit firms would be further 
disadvantaged. If, on the other hand, the cap were set too low, this might have a 
negative impact on the quality for the audit of major listed companies.”). 
 143. Id. at 12-13 (noting that this offers the advantage of alleviating the burden on 
mid-sized accounting firms, thus promoting competition). 
 144. Id. at 13. 
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Finally, an alternative approach would be to implement a policy of 
proportionate liability, limiting the auditor’s damages to those caused by 
their own mistakes and not the mistakes of their clients.145  This would 
run counter to the usual system of joint and several liability, whereby 
auditing firms may “bear a portion of the charges resulting from the 
misconduct of the audited company, in particular if that company goes 
bankrupt.”146  Instead, under the proportional liability method, courts 
could allocate damages according to the portion of fault attributed to the 
auditing company, or allow auditing firms and their clients to work out 
contractual agreements specifying the proportion of liability.147  On the 
downside, this method of apportioning damage may seem less trans-
parent to the public than simply setting a clearly defined cap on liabili-
ty.148  Nonetheless, out of all these methods, the proportionate liability 
option has gained support even amongst skeptics of liability capping.149  
Furthermore, it is possible to imagine a combination of these approach-
es, such as layering a variable cap on top of a proportionate liability 
system.  Although the U.S. has adopted a system of proportionate liabi-
lity, auditors are still offered less protection than in the European Union, 
due to the United States’ allowance of punitive damages.150 
Currently, five European countries impose a liability cap on audit-
ing firms: Austria, Belgium, Germany, Greece, and Slovenia.151  Though 
the amount and nature of the caps vary among each country, they all 
impose a limit on the liability of auditing firms.152  In an effort to exam-
 145. Id. 
 146. Id. at 4. 
 147. Id. at 13. 
 148. Id. at 12 (“A variable cap would be more transparent . . . as compared with 
proportionate liability.”). 
 149. Letter from Ondrej Petr, Regulatory Policy – Primary Mkts., Int’l Capital Mkt. 
Ass’n, to Jim Bellingham, Corporate Law & Governance Directorate, Dep’t of Trade & 
Indus. 2 (May 30, 2007), available at http://www.icma-group.org/getdoc/51ac14c2-
01c2-401d-9f00-6c2e22fcdd2b/ICMA-Response-to-DTI-CP-re-Statutory-Audit-
Directi.aspx (“[W]e find proportionate liability (rather than fixed liability caps) the least 
problematic solution . . . .”). 
 150. COMMISSION PAPER, supra note 128, at 7-8. 
 151. LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY, supra note 131, at 153. 
 152. Slovenia sets the liability at a steady €150,000; Greece sets the liability at “Five 
times the total of the annual emoluments of the President of the Supreme Court or the 
total of the fees of the liable Certified Auditor in the previous financial year provided 
that the latter exceeded the former limit”; Austria sets the limit based on the size of 
auditing firm; Belgium and Germany set the liability according to whether the auditing 
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ine how empirically successful these liability caps are in advancing the 
aforementioned policies, the London School of Economics conducted a 
study which compared the results of countries with liability caps to those 
without such caps.153  The study analyzed several different criteria and 
came up with many relevant conclusions: 
 
• In some circumstances, the cost of unlimited liability may out-
weigh the benefits.154 
• Audit quality is not adversely affected by the presence of 
liability caps.155 
• According to auditing firms polled, firms in countries with un-
limited liability schemes find it harder to recruit and retain 
qualified talent.156  These firms also feel that unlimited liability 
reduces their ability to supply the audit market.157 
• Liability caps may help increase competition by the lowering the 
barriers to competition facing middle-tier firms.158 
 
Finally, two additional points are worthy of mention.  First, the 
study found that, according to the data available, comparisons of 
countries with liability caps and those without liability caps showed no 
significant difference in the average dollar amount of recovery on 
claims.159  The reason is that, in countries that cap liability, the cap only 
applies to negligent conduct.160  That is, that cap may be disregarded 
where the auditor’s conduct is found to be intentional or grossly 
negligent.  This has resulted in many plaintiffs alleging intentional 
wrongdoing or fraud, in an attempt to get a higher recovery or settle-
firm is listed or unlisted.  See LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY, supra note 131, at 187-88. 
 153. LONDON ECONOMICS STUDY, supra note 131, at 164-65. 
 154. Id. at 177 (“[U]nlimited liability may in certain cases imply that the costs of 
unlimited liability exceed the benefits from a welfare point of view.”). 
 155. Id. at 158 (“[W]e conclude that audit quality, as proxied by accruals 
management, does not appear to be significantly affected by the existence of a cap.”). 
 156. Id. at 176. 
 157. Id. at 180 (“Overall, the unlimited liability regime is perceived as having a 
potentially significant impact on the capacity of firms to supply the audit market.”). 
 158. Id. at 164 (“This suggests that the existence of an auditor liability cap may help 
middle-tier firms break into the market segment that is largely dominated by the Big-4 
firms in many countries.  The very small size of the sample with an auditor liability cap, 
however, does not allow one to draw strong inferences from the data.”). 
 159. Id. at 159. 
 160. Id. 
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ment.161  Thus, liability caps can still be circumvented to some extent, 
depending on the plaintiff’s pleading.  Second, the study also states that 
“parties seeking compensation for a loss . . . are likely to seek greater 
compensation from directors and officers when the auditor’s liability is 
limited.”162  These points show that even where auditor liability is 
capped in some way, the larger issues of pleading requirements and veil 
piercing still must be addressed. 
CONCLUSION 
While post-Enron legislation and regulation, namely Sarbanes-
Oxley, was intended to change the complexion of professional liability 
for corporate officers and accountants alike, in reality, there hasn’t been 
a major shift in claim activity.163  In fact, rather than rectify the crisis of 
confidence in U.S. corporate governance and financial reporting, 
Sarbanes-Oxley has actually created a number of gray areas in its inter-
pretation which has led to legal experts, auditors, and corporate execu-
tives searching for some solid guidance and alternative solutions.164  
Moreover, it appears that even when a corporate officer submits a fraud-
ulent certification to the SEC, the false certification alone will not be 
sufficient to establish scienter and to pierce the corporate veil.  Now that 
the Supreme Court has resolved the split in the Circuit Courts of Appeal 
on the issue of what is a “strong inference of scienter” in Tellabs, it is 
time to resolve the issue currently making its way through the federal 
District Courts – the issue of whether signing a false Section 302 
certification provision is enough to establish scienter and to survive the 
pleading stage.  While some industry groups seek to “swing the pendu-
lum back” to less federal oversight and more self-regulation, the ability 
of individual investors to hold a CEO’s and CFO’s feet to the fire for his 
false financial certifications seems to not be the panacea initially fore-
seen by members of the legislature and investors.  Despite the codifica-
tion of personal liability provisions such as Sections 302 and 906 of 
SOX, it appears that litigants must still leap the high hurdle of demon-
strating a strong inference of scienter – the same requirement established 
long before SOX – in order to pierce the corporate veil and hold those 
 161. Id. 
 162. Id. at 196. 
 163. See Russell, supra note 126. 
 164. Ghoshray, supra note 57, at 488. 
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officers who committed fraud responsible for the devastation their 
actions have caused. 
First, Congress must revisit the language it used in Sections 302 
and 906 and amend the statute to specifically provide that a CEO’s or 
CFO’s signature on a fraudulent certification does establish a strong in-
ference of scienter.  Leaving this evaluation to the courts on a case-by-
case basis will only expand the myriad of interpretations employed by 
the federal district courts and will exacerbate the inconsistency that al-
ready exists on the issue.  As discussed above, despite the fact that the 
Supreme Court has provided the framework for defining a “strong 
inference” of scienter in the Tellabs case, the federal district courts are 
still “all over the map” on the issue of whether fraudulent certifications 
alone establish that inference.  The certification provisions were includ-
ed for the express purpose of exposing CEOs and CFOs to personal 
liability, based on the fact that these officers are supposed to be certify-
ing that the information contained in the financial statements to the SEC 
is accurate and true.165  Therefore, in the view of the author, when the 
certified documents contain fraudulent information, the certification 
should absolutely be interpreted as providing a strong inference of 
scienter. 
Next, Congress should consider employing a hybrid of the 
European methods for handling auditor liability by creating a variable 
cap that slides up or down based on the auditing company’s size and/or 
fees, while simultaneously providing a ceiling above which no litigant 
can recover against the auditing company.  These caps should be speci-
fically applied to situations of negligence; all caps should be removed 
for instances of intentional wrongdoing or grossly negligent conduct on 
the part of the auditors.  This would hopefully provide some security for 
the continued viability of the “Big Four” and will also remove some of 
the barriers to future growth in the industry. 
By implementing the above two suggestions, Congress will loosen 
the restraints for litigants to get to the executives who are essentially the 
“head” of the securities fraud monster, while simultaneously limiting the 
exposure of auditing firms.  These proposals listed above would thereby 
accomplish two goals:  (1) to re-sharpen the blade on the SOX sword, 
enabling litigants to pierce the corporate veil and to reach those exec-
 165. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002) (subjecting officers 
who intentionally make false Section 906 certifications to up to $5 million in fines and 
twenty years in prison). 
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utives who are directly responsible for the fraudulent schemes that have 
devastated the financial markets in recent years; and, (2) to place some 
limitations on the liability of the accounting firms, with the hope that the 
capped liability will still remain a sufficient incentive to operate up to 
ethical and regulatory standards, while providing the framework to inject 
some stability into the industry. 
 
